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Abstract
In the future, artificial learning agents are likely to become increasingly widespread
in our society. They will interact with both other learning agents and humans in a
variety of complex settings including social dilemmas. We consider the problem
of how an external agent can promote cooperation between artificial learners by
distributing additional rewards and punishments based on observing the learners’
actions. We propose a rule for automatically learning how to create right incentives
by considering the players’ anticipated parameter updates. Using this learning
rule leads to cooperation with high social welfare in matrix games in which the
agents would otherwise learn to defect with high probability. We show that the
resulting cooperative outcome is stable in certain games even if the planning agent
is turned off after a given number of episodes, while other games require ongoing
intervention to maintain mutual cooperation. However, even in the latter case, the
amount of necessary additional incentives decreases over time.
1 Introduction
Social dilemmas highlight conflicts between individual and collective interests. Cooperation allows
for better outcomes for all participants, but individual participants are tempted to increase their own
payoff at the expense of others. Selfish incentives can therefore destabilize the socially desirable
outcome of mutual cooperation and often lead to outcomes that make everyone worse off (Van Lange
et al., 2013).
Cooperation often emerges due to direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971) or indirect reciprocity (Nowak
and Sigmund, 2005). However, even if these mechanisms are not sufficient on their own, humans
are often able to establish cooperation by changing the structure of the social dilemma. This is often
referred to as mechanism design. For instance, institutions such as the police and the judicial system
incentivize humans to cooperate in the social dilemma of peaceful coexistence, and have succeeded
in dramatically reducing rates of violence (Pinker, 2011).
Studies of social dilemmas have traditionally focused on the context of human agents. However,
in the future, artificial learning agents will likely be increasingly widespread in our society, and be
employed in a variety of economically relevant tasks. In that case, they will interact both with other
artificial agents and humans in complex and partially competitive settings.
This raises the question of how we can ensure that artificial agents will learn to navigate the resulting
social dilemmas productively and safely. Failing to learn cooperative policies would lead to socially
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inefficient or even disastrous outcomes. In particular, the escalation of conflicts between artificial
agents (or between artificial agents and humans) may pose a serious security risk in safety-critical
systems. The behaviour of artificial agents in cooperation problems is thus of both theoretical and
practical importance.
In this work, we will examine how mechanism design can promote beneficial outcomes in social
dilemmas among artificial learners. We consider a setting with N agents in a social dilemma and
an additional planning agent that can distribute (positive or negative) rewards to the players after
observing their actions, and aims to guide the learners to a socially desirable outcome (as measured
by the sum of rewards).
We derive a learning rule that allows the planning agent to learn how to set the additional incentives by
looking ahead at how the agents will update their policy parameter in the next learning step. We also
extend the method to settings in which the planning agent does not know what internal parameters
the other agents use and does not have direct access to the opponents’ policy.
We evaluate the learning rule on several different matrix game social dilemmas. The planning agent
learns to successfully guide the learners to cooperation with high social welfare in all games, while
they learn to defect in the absence of a planning agent. We show that the resulting cooperative
outcome is stable in certain games even if the planning agent is turned off after a given number of
episodes. In other games, cooperation is unstable without continued intervention. However, even in
the latter case, we show that the amount of necessary additional rewards decreases over time.
2 Related Work
The study of social dilemmas has a long tradition in game theory, theoretical social science, and
biology. In particular, there is a substantial body of literature that fruitfully employs matrix games to
study how stable mutual cooperation can emerge (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). Key mechanisms that
can serve to stabilize the socially preferred outcome of mutual cooperation include direct reciprocity
(Trivers, 1971), indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005), and norm enforcement (Axelrod,
1986). Bachrach et al. (2009) examine how cooperation can be stabilized via supplemental payments
from an external party.
Our work is inspired by the field of mechanism design, pioneered by Vickrey (1961), which aims to
design economic mechanisms and institutions to achieve certain goals, most notably social welfare or
revenue maximization. Seabright (1993) studies how informal and formal incentives for cooperative
behaviour can prevent a tragedy of the commons. Mechanism design has also been studied in the
context of computerized agents (Varian, 1995) and combined with machine learning techniques
(Narasimhan et al., 2016).
We also draw on the rich literature on multi-agent reinforcement learning. It is beyond the scope
of this work to review all relevant methods in multi-agent reinforcement learning, so we refer the
reader to existing surveys on the subject (Busoniu et al., 2008; Tuyls and Weiss, 2012). However, we
note that most work in multi-agent reinforcement learning considers coordination or communication
problems in the fully cooperative setting, where the agents share a common goal(Omidshafiei et al.,
2017; Foerster et al., 2016).
As an exception, Leibo et al. (2017) study the learned behaviour of deep Q-networks in a fruit-
gathering game and a Wolfpack hunting game that represent sequential social dilemmas. Tampuu
et al. (2017) successfully train agents to play Pong with either a fully cooperative, a fully competitive,
or a mixed cooperative-competitive objective. Crandall et al. (2018) introduce a learning algorithm
that uses novel mechanisms for generating and acting on signals to learn to cooperate with humans
and with other machines in iterated matrix games. Finally, Lowe et al. (2017) propose a centralized
actor-critic architecture that is applicable to both the fully cooperative as well as the mixed cooperative-
competitive setting.
However, these methods assume a given set of opponent policies as given in that they do not take into
account how one’s actions affect the parameter updates on other agents. In contrast, Foerster et al.
(2017) introduce Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA), an algorithm that explicitly
attempts to shape the opponent’s anticipated learning. The LOLA learning rule includes an additional
term that reflects the effect of the agent’s policy on the parameter update of the other agents and
inspired the learning rule in this work. However, while LOLA leads to emergent cooperation in an
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iterated Prisoner’s dilemma, the aim of LOLA agents is to shape the opponent’s learning to their own
advantage, which does not always promote cooperation.
3 Background
3.1 Markov Games
We consider partially observable Markov games (Littman, 1994) as a multi-agent extension of
Markov decision processes (MDPs). An N -player Markov gameM is defined by a set of states S,
an observation function O : S × {1, . . . , N} → Rd specifying each player’s d-dimensional view, a
set of actions A1, . . . ,AN for each player, a transition function T : S ×A1 × · · · × AN → P(S),
where P(S) denotes the set of probability distributions over S , and a reward function ri : S ×A1 ×
· · · × AN → R for each player. To choose actions, each player uses a policy pii : Oi → P(Ai),
where Oi = {oi | s ∈ S, oi = O(s, i)} is the observation space of player i. Each player in a Markov
game aims to maximize its discounted expected return Ri =
∑T
t=0 γ
trti , where γ is a discount factor
and T is the time horizon.
3.2 Policy gradient methods
Policy gradient methods (Sutton and Barto, 1998) are a popular choice for a variety of reinforcement
learning tasks. Suppose the policy piθ of an agent is parametrized by θ. Policy gradient methods
aim to maximize the objective J(θ) = Es∼ppiθ ,a∼piθ [R] by updating the agent’s policy steps in the
direction of∇θJ(θ).
Using the policy gradient theorem (Sutton et al., 2000), we can write the gradient as follows:
∇θJ(θ) = Es∼ppiθ ,a∼piθ [∇θ log piθ(a|s) Qpiθ (s, a)] (1)
where ppiθ is the state distribution and Qpiθ (s, a) = E[R|st = s, at = a].
3.3 Matrix Game Social Dilemmas
A matrix game is the special case of two-player perfectly observable Markov games with |S| = 1,
T = 1 and A1 = A2 = {C,D}. That is, two actions are available to each player, which we will
interpret as cooperation and defection.
C D
C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
Table 1: Payoff matrix of a symmetric 2-player matrix game. A cell of X,Y represents a utility of X
to the row player and Y to the column player.
Table 1 shows the generic payoff structure of a (symmetric) matrix game. Players can receive
four possible rewards: R (reward for mutual cooperation), P (punishment for mutual defection),
T (temptation of defecting against a cooperator), and S (sucker outcome of cooperating against a
defector).
A matrix game is considered a social dilemma if the following conditions hold (Macy and Flache,
2002):
1. Mutual cooperation is preferable to mutual defection: R > P
2. Mutual cooperation is preferable to being exploited: R > S
3. Mutual cooperation is preferable to an equal probability of unilateral defection by either
player: R > T+S2
4. The players have some reason to defect because exploiting a cooperator is preferable to
mutual cooperation (T > R) or because mutual defection is preferable to being exploited
(P > S).
The last condition reflects the mixed incentive structure of matrix game social dilemmas. We will
refer to the motivation to exploit a cooperator (quantified by T −R) as greed and to the motivation to
avoid being exploited by a defector (P − S) as fear. As shown in Table 2, we can use the presence or
absence of greed and fear to categorize matrix game social dilemmas.
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Chicken C D
C 3, 3 1, 4
D 4, 1 0, 0
Stag Hunt C D
C 4, 4 0, 3
D 3, 0 1, 1
PD C D
C 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 1, 1
Table 2: The three canonical examples of matrix game social dilemmas with different reasons to
defect. In Chicken, agents may defect out of greed, but not out of fear. In Stag Hunt, agents can never
get more than the reward of mutual cooperation by defecting, but they may still defect out of fear of a
non-cooperative partner. In Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), agents are motivated by both greed and fear
simultaneously.
4 Methods
4.1 Amended Markov game including the planning agent
Suppose N agents play a Markov game described by S, A1 . . .AN , r1, . . . , rn, O and T . We
introduce a planning agent that can hand out additional rewards and punishments to the players and
aims to use this to ensure the socially preferred outcome of mutual cooperation.
To do this, the Markov game can be amended as follows. We add another action set Ap ⊂ RN that
represents which additional rewards and punishments are available to the planning agent. Based on
its observation Op : S × {1, . . . , N} → Rd and the other player’s actions a1, . . . , an, the planning
agent takes an action ap = (r
p
1 , . . . , r
p
N ) ∈ Ap ⊂ RN .1 The new reward function of player i is
r
(tot)
i = ri + r
p
i , i.e. the sum of the original reward and the additional reward, and we denote the
corresponding value functions as V toti (θ1, . . . , θN ) = Vi(θ1, . . . , θN ) + V
p
i (θ1, . . . , θN ). Finally,
the transition function T formally receives ap as an additional argument, but does not depend on it
(T (s, a1, . . . , aN , ap) = T (s, a1, . . . , aN )).
4.2 The learning problem
Let θ1, . . . , θN and θp be parametrizations of the player’s policies pi1, . . . , piN and the planning
agent’s policy pip.
The planning agent aims to maximize the total social welfare V (θ1, . . . , θN ) :=∑N
i=1 Vi(θ1, . . . , θN ), which is a natural metric of how socially desirable an outcome is. Note
that without restrictions on the set of possible additional rewards and punishments, i.e. Ap = RN ,
the planning agent can always transform the game into a fully cooperative game by choosing
rpi =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i rj .
However, it is difficult to learn how to set the right incentives using traditional reinforcement learning
techniques. This is because V (θ1, . . . , θN ) does not depend directly on θp. The planning agent’s
actions only affect V (θ1, . . . , θN ) indirectly by changing the parameter updates of the learners. For
this reason, it is vital to explicitly take into account how the other agents’ learning changes in response
to additional incentives.
This can be achieved by considering the next learning step of each player (cf. (Foerster et al., 2017)).
We assume that the learners update their parameters by simple gradient ascent:
∆θi = ηi∇iV toti (θ1, . . . , θN ) = ηi(∇iVi(θ1, . . . , θN ) +∇iV pi (θ1, . . . , θN )) (2)
where ηi is step size of player i and ∇i := ∇θi is the gradient with respect to parameters θi.
Instead of optimizing V (θ1, . . . , θN ), the planning agent looks ahead one step and maximizes
V (θ1 + ∆θ1, . . . , θN + ∆θN ). Assuming that the parameter updates ∆θi are small, a first-order
Taylor expansion yields
V (θ1 + ∆θ1, . . . , θN + ∆θN ) ≈ V (θ1, . . . , θN ) +
N∑
i=1
(∆θi)
T∇iV (θ1, . . . , θN ) (3)
1Technically, we could represent the dependence on the other player’s actions by introducing an extra step
after the regular step in which the planning agent chooses additional rewards and punishments. However, for
simplicity, we will discard this and treat the player’s actions and the planning action as a single step. Formally,
we can justify this by letting the planning agent specify its action for every possible combination of player
actions.
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We use a simple rule of the form ∆θp = ηp∇pV (θ1 + ∆θ1, . . . , θN + ∆θN ) to update the planning
agent’s policy, where ηp is the learning step size of the planning agent. Exploiting the fact that
V (θ1, . . . , θN ) does not depend directly on θp, i.e. ∇pV (θ1, . . . , θN ) = 0, we can calculate the
gradient:
∇pV (θ1 + ∆θ1, . . . , θN + ∆θN ) ≈
N∑
i=1
∇p(∆θi)T∇iV (θ1, . . . , θN )
=
N∑
i=1
ηi(∇p∇iV toti (θ1, . . . , θN ))T∇iV (θ1, . . . , θN )
=
N∑
i=1
ηi(∇p∇iV pi (θ1, . . . , θN ))T∇iV (θ1, . . . , θN )
(4)
since ∇iVi(θ1, . . . , θN ) does not depend on θp either.
4.3 Policy gradient approximation
If the planning agent does not have access to the exact gradients V pi (θ1, . . . , θN ) and V (θ1, . . . , θN ),
we use policy gradients as an approximation. Let τ = (s0,a0, a0p, r
0 . . . , sT ,a
T, aTp , r
T) be a
state-action trajectory of horizon T + 1, where at = (at1, . . . , a
t
N ), r
T = (rt1, . . . , r
t
N ), and a
t
p ==
(rt1,p, . . . , r
t
N,p) are the actions taken and rewards received in time step t. Then, the episodic return
R0i (τ) =
∑T
t=0 γ
trti and R
0
i,p(τ) =
∑T
t=0 γ
trti,p approximate Vi(θ1, . . . , θN ) and V
p
i (θ1, . . . , θN ),
respectively. Similarly, R0(τ) =
∑N
i=0R
0
i (τ) approximates the social welfare V (θ1, . . . , θN ).
We can now calculate the gradients using the policy gradient theorem:
∇iVi(θ1, . . . , θN ) ≈ ∇iE[R0i (τ)] = E[∇i log pii(τ)R0i (τ)] (5)
The other gradients ∇iV (θ1, . . . , θN ) and ∇p∇iV pi (θ1, . . . , θN ) can be approximated in the same
way. This yields the following rule for the parameter update of the planning agent:
∆θp = ηp
N∑
i=1
ηi
(
E
[∇p log pip(τ)∇i log pii(τ)R0i,p(τ)])T · E [∇i log pii(τ)R0(τ)] (6)
4.4 Opponent modeling
Equations 4 and 6 assume that the planning agent has access to each agent’s internal policy parameters
and gradients. This is a restrictive assumption. In particular, agents may have an incentive to conceal
their inner workings in adversarial settings. However, if the assumption is not fulfilled, we can
instead model the opponents’ policies using parameter vectors θˆ1, . . . , θˆN and infer the value of these
parameters from the player’s actions (Ross et al., 2010). A simple approach is to use a maximum
likelihood estimate based on the observed trajectory:
θˆi = arg max
θ
′
i
T∑
t=0
log piθ′i
(ait|st). (7)
Given this, we can substitute θˆi for θi in equation 4.
4.5 Cost of additional rewards
In real-world examples, it may be costly to distribute additional rewards or punishment. We can
model this cost by changing the planning agent’s objective to V (θ1 + ∆θ1, . . . , θN + ∆θN ) −
α||V p(θ1, . . . , θN ; θp)||2, where α is a cost parameter and V p = (V p1 , . . . , V pN ). The modified
update rule is (using equation 4)
∆θp = ηp
(
N∑
i=1
ηi(∇p∇iV pi (θ1, . . . , θN ))T∇iV (θ1, . . . , θN )− α∇p||V p(θ1, . . . , θN ; θp)||2
)
(8)
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5 Experimental setup
In our experiments, we consider N = 2 learning agents playing a matrix game social dilemma
(MGSD) as outlined in section 3.3. The learners are simple agents with a single policy parameter
θ that controls the probability of cooperation and defection: P (C) = exp(x)1+exp(x) , P (D) =
1
1+exp(x) .
The agents use a centralized critic (Lowe et al., 2017) to learn their value function.
The agents play 4000 episodes of a matrix game social dilemma. We fix the payoffs R = 3 and
P = 1, which allows us to describe the game using the level of greed and fear. We will consider three
canonical matrix game social dilemmas as shown in Table 3.
Game Greed Fear T S
Prisoner’s Dilemma 1 1 4 0
Chicken 0.5 -1 3.5 2
Stag Hunt -1 1 2 0
Table 3: Levels of fear and greed and resulting temptation (T ) and sucker (S) payoffs in three matrix
games. Note that the level of greed in Chicken has to be smaller than 1 because it is otherwise not a
social dilemma (R > T+S2 is not fulfilled).
The planning agent’s policy is parametrized by a single layer neural network. We limit the maximum
amount of additional rewards or punishments (i.e. we restrictAp to vectors that satisfy maxNi=1 |rpi | ≤
c for a given constant c). Unless specified otherwise, we use a step size of 0.01 for both the planning
agent and the learners, use cost regularisation (Equation 8) with a cost parameter of 0.0002, set the
maximum reward to 3, and use the exact value function. In some experiments, we also require that
the planning agent can only redistribute rewards, but cannot change the total sum of rewards (i.e. Ap
is restricted to vectors that satisfy
∑N
i=1 r
p
i = 0). We refer to this as the revenue-neutral setting
6 Results
In this section, we summarize the experimental results.2 We aim to answer the following questions:
• Does the introduction of the planning agent succeed in promoting significantly higher levels
of cooperation?
• What qualitative conclusions can be drawn about the amount of additional incentives needed
to learn and maintain cooperation?
• In which cases is it possible to achieve cooperation even when the planning agent is only
active for a limited timespan?
• How does a restriction to revenue-neutrality affect the effectiveness of mechanism design?
Figure 1a illustrates that the players learn to cooperate with high probability if the planning agent is
present, resulting in the socially preferred outcome of stable mutual cooperation. Thus the planning
agent successfully learns how to distribute additional rewards to guide the players to a better outcome.
Figure 1b shows how the planning agent rewards or punishes the player conditional on each of the
four possible outcomes. At first, the planning agent learns to reward cooperation, which creates a
sufficient incentive to cause the players to learn to cooperate. In Figure 1c we show how this changes
the level of fear and greed in the modified game. The levels of greed and fear soon drop below zero,
which means that the modified game is no longer a social dilemma.
Note that rewarding cooperation is less costly than punishing defection if (and only if) cooperation is
the less common action. After the player learns to cooperate with high probability, the planning agent
learns that it is now less costly to punish defection and consequently stops handing out additional
rewards in the case of mutual cooperation outcome. As shown in Figure 1d, the amount of necessary
additional rewards converges to 0 over time as defection becomes increasingly rare.
Table 4 summarizes the results of all three canonical social dilemmas. Without adaptive mechanism
design, the learners fail to achieve mutual cooperation in all cases. By contrast, if the planning agent
2Source code available at https://github.com/tobiasbaumann1/Adaptive_Mechanism_Design
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(a) Probability of cooperation (b) Additional rewards for player 1
(c) Fear and greed in the modified game (d) Cumulative additional rewards
Figure 1: Mechanism design over 4000 episodes of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The initial probability of
cooperation is 0.25 for each player. Shown is (a) the probability of cooperation over time, (b) the
additional reward for the first player in each of the four possible outcomes, (c) the resulting levels of
fear and greed including additional rewards, and (d) the cumulative amount of distributed rewards.
is turned on, the learners learn to cooperate with high probability, resulting in a significantly higher
level of social welfare.
Greed Fear No mech. design With mech. design Turning off
P (C,C) V P (C,C) V P (C,C) V
Prisoner’s
Dilemma 1 1
0.004%
±0.001%
2.024
±0.003
98.7%
±0.1%
5.975
±0.002
0.48%
±0.4%
2.60
±0.69
Chicken 0.5 -1 3.7%±1.3%
5.44
±0.01
99.0%
±0.1%
5.995
±0.001
53.8%
±29.4%
5.728
±0.174
Stag Hunt -1 1 0.004%±0.002%
2.00
±0.00
99.1%
±0.1%
5.964
±0.005
99.6%
±0.0%
5.986
±0.002
Table 4: Comparison of the resulting levels of cooperation after 4000 episodes, a) without mechanism
design, b) with mechanism design, and c) when turning off the planning agent after 4000 episodes and
running another 4000 episodes. Each cell shows the mean and standard deviation of ten training runs.
P (C,C) is the probability of mutual cooperation at the end of training and V is the expected social
welfare that results from the players’ final action probabilities. The initial probability of cooperation
is 0.25 for each player.
The three games differ, however, in whether the cooperative outcome obtained through mechanism
design is stable even when the planning agent is turned off. Without additional incentives, mutual
cooperation is not a Nash equilibrium in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and in Chicken (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991), which is why one or both players learn to defect again after the planning agent is turned
off. These games thus require continued (but only occasional) intervention to maintain cooperation.
7
By contrast, mutual cooperation is a stable equilibrium in Stag Hunt (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
As shown in Table 4, this means that long-term cooperation in Stag Hunt can be achieved even if the
planning agent is only active over a limited timespan (and thus at limited cost).
Greed Fear Exact V Exact VRevenue-neutral Estimated V
P (C,C) AAR P (C,C) AAR P (C,C) AAR
Prisoner’s
Dilemma 1 1
98.7%
±0.1%
0.77
±0.21
91.4%
±1.0%
0.61
±0.04
61.3%
±20.0%
3.31
±0.63
Chicken 0.5 -1 99.0%±0.1%
0.41
±0.02
98.9%
±0.1%
0.31
±0.02
52.2%
±18.6%
2.65
±0.31
Stag Hunt -1 1 99.1%±0.1%
0.45
±0.02
69.2%
±45.3%
0.19
±0.11
96.0%
±1.2%
4.89
±0.39
Table 5: Resulting levels of cooperation and average additional rewards (AAR) per round for different
variants of the learning rule. The variants differ in whether they use the exact value function (Equation
4) or an estimate (Equation 6) and in whether the setting is revenue-neutral or unrestricted.
Table 5 compares the performance of different variants of the learning rule. Interestingly, restricting
the possible planning actions to redistribution leads to lower probabilities of cooperation in Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Stag Hunt, but not in Chicken. We hypothesize that this is because in Chicken, mutual
defection is not in the individual interest of the players anyway. This means that the main task for the
planning agent is to prevent (C,D) or (D,C) outcomes, which can be easily achieved by redistribution.
By contrast, these outcomes are fairly unattractive (in terms of individual interests) in Stag Hunt, so
the most effective intervention is to make (D,D) less attractive and (C,C) more attractive, which is
not feasible by pure redistribution. Consequently, mechanism design by redistribution works best in
Chicken and worst in Stag Hunt.
Using an estimate of the value function leads to inferior performance on all three games, both in
terms of the resulting probability of mutual cooperation and with respect to the amount of distributed
additional results. However, the effect is by far least pronounced in Stag Hunt. This may be because
mutual cooperation is an equilibrium in Stag Hunt, which means that a beneficial outcome can more
easily arise even if the incentive structure created by the planning agent is imperfect.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a method for learning how to create the right incentives to ensure cooperation
between artificial learners. Empirically, we have shown that a planning agent that uses the proposed
learning rule is able to successfully guide the learners to the socially preferred outcome of mutual
cooperation in several different matrix game social dilemmas, while they learn to defect with high
probability in the absence of a planning agent. The resulting cooperative outcome is stable in certain
games even if the planning agent is turned off after a given number of episodes, while other games
require continued (but increasingly rare) intervention to maintain cooperation. We also showed that
restricting the planning agent to redistribution leads to worse performance in Stag Hunt, but not in
Chicken.
In the future, we would like to explore the limitations of adaptive mechanism design in more complex
environments, particularly in games with more than two players, without full observability of the
players’ actions, and using opponent modeling (cf. Equation 7). Future work could also consider
settings in which the planning agent aims to ensure cooperation by altering the dynamics of the
environment or the players’ action set (e.g. by introducing mechanisms that allow players to better
punish defectors or reward cooperators).
Finally, under the assumption that artificial learners will play vital roles in future society, it is
worthwhile to develop policy recommendations that would facilitate mechanism design for these
agents (and the humans they interact with), thus contributing to a cooperative outcome in potential
social dilemmas. For instance, it would be helpful if the agents were set up in a way that makes their
intentions as transparent as possible and allows for simple ways to distribute additional rewards and
punishments without incurring large costs.
8
References
Robert Axelrod. An Evolutionary Approach to Norms. American Political Science Review, 1986.
Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton. The Evolution of Cooperation. Evolution, 1981.
Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Jörg Rothe, and Jeffrey S
Rosenschein. The cost of stability in coalitional games. In International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory, pages 122–134. Springer, 2009.
Lucian Busoniu, Robert Babuska, and Bart De Schutter. A Comprehensive Survey of Multiagent Reinforcement
Learning. Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, 2008. ISSN 1094-6977.
Jacob W. Crandall, Mayada Oudah, Fatimah Ishowo-Oloko, Sherief Abdallah, Jean-François Bonnefon, et al.
Cooperating with machines. Nature communications, 9(1):233, 2018.
Jakob Foerster, Ioannis Alexandros Assael, Nando de Freitas, and Shimon Whiteson. Learning to Communicate
with Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. pages 2137–2145, 2016.
Jakob N. Foerster, Richard Y. Chen, Maruan Al-Shedivat, Shimon Whiteson, Pieter Abbeel, and Igor Mordatch.
Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness. 2017. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1709.04326.
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
Joel Z. Leibo, Vinicius Zambaldi, Marc Lanctot, Janusz Marecki, and Thore Graepel. Multi-agent Reinforcement
Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas. Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and
MultiAgent Systems, 2017. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1702.03037.
Michael L. Littman. Markov games as a framework for multi-agent reinforcement learning. In Machine Learning
Proceedings 1994. 1994.
Ryan Lowe, Yi Wu, Aviv Tamar, Jean Harb, Pieter Abbeel, and Igor Mordatch. Multi-agent actor-critic for
mixed cooperative-competitive environments. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
6382–6393, 2017.
Michael W. Macy and Andreas Flache. Learning Dynamics in Social Dilemmas. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2002.
Harikrishna Narasimhan, Shivani Brinda Agarwal, and David C Parkes. Automated mechanism design without
money via machine learning. 2016.
Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund. Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity, 2005. ISSN 14764687.
Shayegan Omidshafiei, Jason Pazis, Christopher Amato, Jonathan P. How, and John Vian. Deep Decentralized
Multi-task Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning under Partial Observability. 2017. URL http://arxiv.
org/abs/1703.06182.
Steven Pinker. The Better Angels of Our Nature. 2011.
Stephane Ross, Geoffrey J. Gordon, and J. Andrew Bagnell. A Reduction of Imitation Learning and Structured
Prediction to No-Regret Online Learning. 2010. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.0686.
Paul Seabright. Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 7(4):113–134, 1993.
Richard S. Sutton, David A. McAllester, Satinder P. Singh, and Yishay Mansour. Policy gradient methods for
reinforcement learning with function approximation. pages 1057–1063, 2000.
RS Sutton and AG Barto. Reinforcement learning: An introduction. 1998.
Ardi Tampuu, Tambet Matiisen, Dorian Kodelja, Ilya Kuzovkin, Kristjan Korjus, Juhan Aru, Jaan Aru, and Raul
Vicente. Multiagent cooperation and competition with deep reinforcement learning. PLoS ONE, 2017.
Robert L. Trivers. The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 1971.
Karl Tuyls and Gerhard Weiss. Multiagent Learning: Basics, Challenges, and Prospects. AI Magazine, 2012.
Paul A. M. Van Lange, Jeff Joireman, Craig D. Parks, and Eric Van Dijk. The Psychology of Social Dilemmas:
A Review. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120(2):125–141, 2013.
Hal R. Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In USENIX workshop on Electronic
Commerce, pages 13–21, 1995.
William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. The Journal of Finance, 16
(1):8–37, 1961.
9
